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“...a fair show and a square deal”1: New Brunswick and the Renegotiation of 




At the 1935 Dominion-Provincial Conference, New Brunswick was a stalwart defender of 
provincial rights, but by the 1940s it was among the first provinces to cede Ottawa certain tax 
fields in exchange for a fixed payment, thereby contributing to the centralization of power in 
federal hands. This article documents the evolution of New Brunswick’s constitutional position 
during the late 1930s and 1940s. It shows that although financial exigencies helped shape the 
province’s constitutional stance, the structure of the 1940’s tax rental agreements also contributed 
to New Brunswick Premier John McNair’s willingness to centralize tax authority in Ottawa. The 
agreements’ temporary nature meant that upon their expiry New Brunswick would retain the right 
to the tax fields. 
 
« ... un tour de force et une opération honnête » : le Nouveau-Brunswick et la 
renégociation du fédéralisme canadien de 1938 à 1951 
Résumé 
À la conférence fédérale-provinciale de 1935, le Nouveau-Brunswick a défendu vigoureusement les droits 
provinciaux. Or, dans les années 1940, le Nouveau-Brunswick était l’une des premières provinces à céder à 
Ottawa certains domaines fiscaux en échange d’un paiement fixe, contribuant ainsi à la centralisation du pouvoir 
à Ottawa. Cet article atteste l’évolution de la situation constitutionnelle du Nouveau-Brunswick vers la fin des 
années 1930 et 1940. De plus, il énonce que, même si des exigences financières ont renforcé la situation 
constitutionnelle de la province, la structure des accords de 1940 sur la location de domaines fiscaux a aussi 
contribué à ce que le premier ministre du Nouveau-Brunswick, John McNair, veuille centraliser l’administration 
fiscale à Ottawa. La nature provisoire de l’entente prévoyait par ailleurs qu’à son échéance, le Nouveau-
Brunswick garderait le droit des domaines fiscaux.    
 
The widespread deprivations of the Great Depression prompted Canada’s federal government to examine the 
financial implications of Confederation and investigate the restructuring of the Canadian federal system during the 1940s. 
To this end, both the 1940 Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Rowell-Sirois 
Commission) and the 1945 Green Book on Reconstruction proposed broadly based social welfare programs and public 
works initiatives to benefit the provinces. These were to be funded by a complete reworking of federal-provincial fiscal 
relations whereby the provinces would cede to Ottawa sole authority to levy certain taxes. In essence, these two 
documents represent the beginnings of the Canadian welfare state and led to the protracted constitutional negotiations that 
occupied much of federal and provincial politicians’ time during the 1940s. 
A study of the negotiations surrounding the Rowell-Sirois Report and the Green Book offers a unique opportunity 
to examine provincial interpretations of Canadian federalism as both initiatives provided a forum for the provinces to 
express positions on dominion-provincial relations. With the exception of T. Stephen Henderson’s work on Nova Scotia, 
however, regional scholars have not offered a sustained examination of the evolution of provincial views of federalism 
during the critical decade of the 1940s as the foundation of the modern expansionist welfare state was laid.2 This article 
details New Brunswick’s view of Canadian federalism in the 1940s; it argues that financial exigencies clearly shaped the 
province’s position. Much like Nova Scotia, New Brunswick consistently argued for recognition of fiscal need as a 
principle of federal-provincial fiscal relations and maintained that the provinces that had benefited most in Confederation 
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should help those that had benefited least.3 Although both provinces had similar goals in their federal negotiations with 
Ottawa, New Brunswick’s tenuous financial position made it more vulnerable than Nova Scotia. Consequently, New 
Brunswick strongly advocated for the centralization of tax power in Ottawa in return for a secure source of revenue.4 
Indeed, New Brunswick’s willingness in the 1940s to cede provincial tax fields to the federal government in return for a 
guaranteed payment seemed a radical departure from the province’s stance on constitutional issues during the previous 
decade, when the province was seen as a stalwart defender of provincial rights. 
Historical studies of both the Rowell-Sirois Commission and the Green Book Proposals have tended to overlook 
their implications on federalism, and have instead concentrated on the conflicts in personalities that arose during the 
negotiations or the impact of professional organizations and labour on the proceedings.5 For their part, political scientists 
who have studied federal-provincial relations have ignored much of the twentieth century to focus on either the late-
nineteenth century, when a series of Privy Council decisions gradually decentralized the powers of the state, or the post-
1980 period, when questions relating to Quebec’s place in the federation and the possibilities of secession gained 
prominence.6 Only with the relatively recent renaissance of political history have studies of federalism come back into 
vogue (such that they have), with historians such as Barry Ferguson and Robert Wardaugh offering a perceptive analysis 
of the Rowell-Sirois Commission’s attempt to alter Canadian federalism by recommending the reconfiguration of the 
federal and provincial governments’ responsibilities.7 
The 1940s discussions on federalism were firmly rooted in the unfortunate circumstances of the previous two 
decades. During the 1920s, Maritimers of all stripes came together in the Maritime Rights Movement to lobby the federal 
government for policies that would allow the region to more fully participate in the nation’s economic growth. Although 
the resulting 1926 Royal Commission on Maritime Claims, commonly called the Duncan Commission after its chair 
Andrew Duncan, called for fiscal need subsidies to better allow the Maritime governments to provide essential services, 
this recommendation was never acted upon.8 Meanwhile, the 1930s saw nine years of drought on the Prairies, coupled 
with the occasional grasshopper plague, ruin harvests and turn wheat fields to dust.9 Many farmers were driven onto relief 
rolls, which further strained the already cash-strapped Prairie governments. By November 1937, 407,600 of 
Saskatchewan’s 928,000 people were on relief, and the Prairies were soon almost totally dependent upon federal aid in the 
form of loans to meet their relief costs.10 
Things were little better in 1930s New Brunswick, where the lean years of the 1920s that prompted the Maritime 
Rights agitation precluded the loans that buoyed the west. As a result, economic conditions in the province were bleak, 
especially along the impoverished North Shore, where health and educational services were inadequate and problems in 
the lumber and fishing industries swelled the relief rolls until the municipalities could no longer handle the burden. So 
dire was the situation across Canada that the federal government initiated a series of one-third matching grants, whereby 
the federal, provincial, and municipal governments were each to bear one-third of the cost of administering relief. This 
system was only as strong as its weakest link, and more affluent municipalities in central Canada could more fully 
participate in the scheme than those in the cash-strapped peripheral provinces. This meant that, paradoxically, people in 
those areas most immune to the Depression could receive the most relief, while those in areas most in need of help were 
entitled to lesser payments.11 
New Brunswick was particularly limited by the matching grants system, and on occasion Fredericton and Ottawa 
assisted the municipalities to a greater extent than the system mandated. For example, the provincial and federal 
governments eventually assumed 80 percent of the financial burden for relief in Northumberland County.12 Still, such 
collaboration between Fredericton and Ottawa proved the exception as New Brunswick was notoriously reluctant to 
match, much less increase, the relief contributions of its municipalities. Between 1929 and 1933, New Brunswick’s debt 
charges in relation to provincial revenues almost doubled from 28 percent of provincial revenues to 55 percent.13 With 
debt payments consuming such a large part of the province’s finances, New Brunswick was unwilling to participate in 
other federal-provincial shared-cost initiatives. When public outcry finally prompted the New Brunswick government to 
enter into joint-relief programmes with Ottawa, it did so at a level far below the national average. To compound matters, 
the federal government slashed relief payments to the provinces by 25 percent between April and June 1936, with the end 
result being that by October 1936 the average monthly relief payment in New Brunswick was $1.67, the lowest in 
Canada.14 
The matching grant system proved no more than a stop-gap measure, and by mid-decade the Prairies could no 
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the same. It was becoming clear that the provinces had fiscal responsibilities, such as unemployment relief, education, and 
social services, which they could no longer afford given their weakened economies and inadequate tax bases. Therefore, 
“either new revenue sources must be allotted to them or their constitutional responsibilities and government burdens must 
be replaced.”15 With this as its goal the Rowell-Sirois Commission was struck to uncover, in Prime Minister Mackenzie 
King’s words, “what should be done to secure a more equitable and practical division of the burden [of relief] to enable all 
governments to function more effectively. . .[and] more independently. . .within the spheres of their respective 
jurisdictions.”16 Commissioners were drawn from of each of Canada’s five regions: Ontario’s Newton Rowell, Quebec’s 
Joseph Sirois, the Prairies’ J.W. Dafoe, British Columbia’s Henry Angus, and the Maritimes’ R.A. Mackay.17 
Despite the inclusion of Nova Scotian Mackay, New Brunswick Liberal Premier A.A. Dysart was upset that no 
New Brunswicker was named to the Commission. Commission Chairman Rowell tried to soothe Dysart on this score by 
pointing out that S.A. Saunders, who had been appointed to write an Economic History of the Maritime Provinces for the 
Commission, had been born in Saint John.18 Dysart may have been using New Brunswick’s lack of a commissioner as a 
bargaining chip, for he seemed more concerned that New Brunswick present its submission to the Commission after those 
of Ontario and Quebec so that the central provinces could not refute his claims. Although Rowell tried to assuage Dysart’s 
fears, stating that all provinces would have the chance to respond to the individual submissions, he eventually agreed that 
New Brunswick’s would be the last submission heard by the Commission.19 
After meeting with all other provinces, the Commission arrived in Fredericton on 18 May 1938. Over five days of 
meetings, New Brunswick made a rather curious argument. The province’s brief called for assistance to the poorer 
provinces based on fiscal need, but at the same time it invoked the compact theory of Confederation as justification for a 
subsidy. The compact theory as championed by Ontario Premier Oliver Mowat in the nineteenth century maintained that 
Confederation was the result of a treaty, or compact, among the provinces and therefore could not be altered without 
provincial consent. Given legal validity by favourable Privy Council decisions, Mowat utilized the compact theory to 
effect a more decentralized federal union whereby the provinces were granted greater powers than was originally 
intended.20 New Brunswick’s brief agreed in principle that Confederation was a compact among four autonomous 
provinces. As A.P. Paterson, New Brunswick’s Minister of Federal and Municipal Relations and the main proponent of 
the compact theory, argued, although New Brunswick had surrendered certain powers through the BNA Act, it retained 
the right to retrieve these powers if it felt the federal government had not honoured the terms of Confederation.21 
Moreover, despite the transiency of the BNA Act implicit in the compact theory, New Brunswick framed much of 
its argument before the commissioners around a clause in the BNA Act’s preamble that declared that the intent of 
Confederation was “to conduce to the welfare of the provinces and promote the interests of the empire.”22 For New 
Brunswick’s compact theory proponents, the supposed intent of Confederation to improve the position of the provinces 
superseded any claims of provincial rights or, more precisely, was itself an aspect of provincial rights. Since New 
Brunswick’s financial position had not improved markedly in the years following union, the federal government was 
guilty of not living up to the terms of Confederation. Thus, New Brunswick argued, Ottawa was constitutionally obliged 
to provide fiscal need subsidies to assist the poorer provinces—subsidies that would be paid for, in part, from tax revenue 
collected from the richer provinces.23 As they told the Commission, if a province “is not able to provide for its people the 
same privileges which are enjoyed by those in other provinces,” then Dominion assistance is required to ensure “that 
living conditions be on par with those obtaining elsewhere.” Although New Brunswick did not advocate “a redistribution 
of all the wealth in Canada,” the province did believe that “the burden [of providing the money for fiscal need grants] 
should fall upon those provinces which have profited most” in Confederation.24 Unanswered in New Brunswick’s version 
of the compact theory and the province’s presentation was, if Confederation was a contract among four separate states, 
why should one state be required to subsidize the level of social services in another? As E.R. Forbes has suggested, New 
Brunswick’s rationalization of provincial rights before the Commission while simultaneously lobbying for subsidies based 
upon fiscal need rendered the province an “awkward anomaly.”25 
In any event, the importance of the compact theory to the New Brunswick position with the Rowell-Sirois 
Commission may be overstated. During the 1938 session of the New Brunswick Legislature a schism developed within 
the New Brunswick Liberal Party over the provincial government’s policy of supporting the compact theory. The catalyst 
for this split was the 1935 Dominion-Provincial Conference, called at the height of the Depression to discuss 
unemployment relief. At that meeting, the Liberal government of A.A. Dysart, represented by his trusted lieutenants and 
cabinet ministers A.P. Paterson and J.B. McNair, vetoed the constitutional amendment necessary to allow Ottawa to 
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assume sole responsibility for the unemployed—an amendment to which the other eight provinces had agreed—claiming 
that it impinged on the province’s constitutional responsibilities.26 Led by provincial MLAs W.W.V. Foster and Frank 
Bridges, the Liberal dissidents believed that the provincial government’s position at this conference, where they used the 
compact theory to justify not transferring the responsibility of unemployment relief to Ottawa, was unthinkable during 
such dire economic times. Bridges adroitly summed up their position in the 1939 legislative session when he stated that 
“[n]othing in the wide world is going to hinder and retard the growth and progress of Canada. . .more than this doctrine 
[of the compact theory].”27 Although McNair made a spirited defence of the government’s constitutional position in the 
Legislature, his words apparently fell on deaf ears, for during the provincial election of 1939 the electorate seemed to 
reject the compact theory, retaining a Liberal government but casting staunch compact theory supporter A.P. Paterson 
from office.28 When Paterson offered his services to the provincial government in an advisory role free of charge, he was 
rebuffed. While McNair made another half-hearted defence of the compact theory in 1941, suggesting that the Rowell-
Sirois Commission had confused claims for financial assistance to governments with claims for the relief of a province 
adversely affected by federal policies, it seems likely that had New Brunswick presented its submission to the 
Commission even one year later there would have been much less mention of the compact theory, for with the rejection of 
Paterson’s offer of assistance, New Brunswick’s short-lived adherence to the compact theory had essentially come to an 
end; however, the province’s demand for the recognition of fiscal need would persist.29 
New Brunswick’s waning adherence to the compact theory and the doctrine of provincial rights was illustrated 
when Walter Jones, a distinguished lawyer and Liberal MLA, presented the province’s brief to the Commission. In strong 
terms he reiterated New Brunswick’s commitment to the principle of fiscal need, while taking Ontario to task for arguing 
against the concept of equalization: 
[I]n one large province the point is taken that. . .certain means of taxation should be left to the 
province, which had been invaded by the federal government. There is no suggestion, however, 
that there should be a contribution by the wealthier provinces to the other provinces. In a self 
contained province with plenty of manufacturing and plenty of resources and plenty of wealth, 
where they have the taxation facilities, income tax and that sort of thing, they are sufficient unto 
themselves and they would be quite satisfied and no doubt are quite satisfied that that condition 
should continue. But as I say, in a Federal system our point is that the strong should help the 
weak, and I think you cannot carry out the Federal system unless that principle is recognised.30 
Jones also stated, in an obvious reference to New Brunswick’s impoverished Acadian North Shore, that “[t]here 
are certain parts of this province where it is impossible to provide schools,. . .nursing or doctors” and that “there ought to 
be a reasonable standard of life for every citizen and his family in Canada.”31 However, Jones was not clear about where 
the revenue to provide a reasonable standard of life was to come from. New Brunswick’s written submission to the 
Rowell-Sirois Commission was grounded in the doctrine of provincial rights and called for the Dominion to vacate the 
personal income tax field.32 Thus New Brunswick was essentially calling for the federal government to assume greater 
fiscal responsibilities while shedding its ability to collect revenue. At first Jones defended the province’s written position, 
although he stated that if the Dominion did collect income tax then it should give some of the revenue back to the 
provinces.33 Finally, after being pressed on the subject by Commissioner J.W. Dafoe, Jones said that “I think that we 
would prefer that they [the federal government] should tax the rich and give us a fair proportion of it,” thereby revealing 
his province’s willingness to endorse the centralization of fiscal power in Ottawa’s hands in return for a fixed payment.34 
Following New Brunswick’s presentation, the Commission spent a year and a half writing its Report. During this 
time major changes took place throughout the world, the greatest of which was the outbreak of the Second World War.  
Overshadowed by the events in Europe were changes in New Brunswick, where A.A. Dysart retired from public life in 
March 1940. Dysart was replaced by his former Attorney-General and “chief lieutenant” J.B. McNair.35 McNair had been 
a star pupil at the University of New Brunswick, receiving a BA with double honours in 1911, winning the Governor-
General’s Medal and the Lieutenant-Governor’s Prize, and being Valedictorian of his class. These achievements earned 
him a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford University, where he received a BA in jurisprudence in 1913 and a Bachelor of Civil 
Law degree in 1914. Following his service in World War One, McNair returned to New Brunswick to practise law in 
Fredericton until entering politics as a Liberal in 1935. By the time Dysart left office McNair was seen as the former 
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scholar and in public life,” and he had performed admirably as the defender of the government’s constitutional position in 
the previous year’s legislative session.36 
Within a few months of McNair’s inauguration, The Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion Provincial 
Relations was tabled in Parliament.37 The Report was an extraordinary document calling for a complete revamping of 
federal-provincial fiscal relations and heralding the beginning of the modern welfare state with its broader and more 
interventionist government role. Significantly for New Brunswick, the commissioners recognized that regional disparities 
existed by acknowledging that some provincial governments had budgetary surpluses while others struggled to provide 
“those community services which Canadians have come to look on as the minimum which their governments should 
supply.”38 Key among the Commission’s financial recommendations was the centralization of tax authority. In return for 
their granting Ottawa sole authority to levy income, corporation, and succession taxes, thereby simplifying the tax 
structure and doing away with double taxation, the provinces would be relieved of having to provide for the unemployed. 
Moreover, the commissioners recommended the provinces forego all federal subsidies that they were receiving in return 
for Ottawa’s assumption of all provincial debts. Meanwhile, a system of National Adjustment Grants, designed to ensure a 
minimum standard of social services for all Canadians, would be instituted. To arrive at the amount that each province 
was to receive, the Commission calculated the cost of ensuring a desired minimum standard of services and compared that 
sum with the province’s revenues. If there was a deficit—that is, if a province’s revenue was less than the required 
expenditure—then the province would receive a National Adjustment Grant, which made it tantamount to a fiscal need 
subsidy.39 Six provinces, New Brunswick among them, were to receive National Adjustment Grants, with Ontario, 
Alberta, and British Columbia being excluded. 
The commissioners were careful to emphasize that although their financial recommendations may appear at odds 
with the BNA Act, there were also some remarkable similarities. In 1867 Ottawa was given the most lucrative taxing 
power of the day: the customs and excise tax. Likewise, the commissioners recommended that Ottawa be granted what in 
1939 was the chief taxing power: personal income, corporation, and succession taxes. In 1867 the Dominion paid the 
provinces subsidies to assist them in performing their responsibilities. In 1939 the proposed National Adjustment Grants 
would fill this role.40 And although Ottawa would pay the provinces these grants to ensure a national minimum standard 
of social services, the actual responsibility for administering these services would remain with the provinces. Social 
services had been delegated to the provinces under the British North America Act, and there was to be no redistribution of 
jurisdiction.41 In essence, the commissioners did not believe that they were rewriting the constitution; they were merely 
updating it while remaining committed to the classical liberal ideology that underscored it. 
The publication of the Rowell-Sirois Report necessitated a January 1941 meeting between the federal and 
provincial governments to discuss its recommendations. On this conference’s second day the premiers of Ontario, Alberta, 
and British Columbia, perhaps motivated in part by their provinces’ exclusion from the National Adjustment Grant 
system, refused to sit on any committees discussing the document. Thus no committees were appointed and the 
conference had for all purposes come to an end. But prior to the conference’s formal dissolution King allowed his 
Minister of Finance, J.L. Ilsley, to suggest that Ottawa would probably have to “invade provincial tax fields such as 
succession duties” in order to fund the war effort, while also opting out of assisting the provincial governments in paying 
the cost of unemployment relief, for which the Dominion paid 40 percent. Moreover, gasoline would likely be rationed, 
thereby diminishing provincial revenues from both gasoline taxes and automobile licences.42 
Prior to the conference’s dissolution, McNair presented New Brunswick’s position. The New Brunswick premier 
viewed the financial plan recommended by the Commission as “the crux of the report,” yet he refused at that early date 
“to express a definite opinion thereon.”43 McNair’s reluctance to formally state a position on the Report at the conference 
stems from a number of factors. A draft version of a speech for the conference in his papers makes clear that McNair was 
caught off guard by the conference as he did not expect it to be held until war’s end. As a result of this “lack of adequate 
prior consideration,” he maintained that the conference was solely of an “exploratory” nature and, as a result, did not 
require the provinces to explicitly endorse or condemn the Report.44 Moreover, McNair seemed to be having a minor 
personal crisis over the proposal. Although he did not say so at the conference, his personal correspondence makes clear 
that the New Brunswick premier was personally “very favourably disposed towards the Report and. . .considered it of 
great value.” At the same time, he was opposed to any over-centralization of authority in Ottawa.45 Thus McNair was in 
an uncomfortable position with regard to the Rowell-Sirois Report, as provincial rights were seemingly in conflict with 
provincial self-interest. McNair believed the Report’s recommendations would benefit his province, but he recognized 
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that implementing those recommendations would require him to cede certain tax rights granted New Brunswick under the 
BNA Act, thereby contributing to the very centralization he had so publicly opposed at the 1935 Dominion-Provincial 
Conference. 
To complicate matters, McNair received mixed messages from his advisors about the impact of the Report’s 
recommendations on his province. In a 29 November 1940 memo, Walter Jones stated bluntly that “[t]he 
recommendations of the Commission seem. . .quite favourable to this province.” In this memo Jones stressed the 
importance of the Commission’s recognition of fiscal need, which seemed to him a fair trade-off to the ceding of the right 
to levy corporation taxes to Ottawa “because of our relatively small corporation taxes.”46 All told, Jones calculated that 
New Brunswick would end up with a budgetary surplus of $2,250,000, or $5.51 per capita, the highest per capita surplus 
in Canada. The second memo, included without signature in the McNair papers, was not nearly so optimistic. Basing its 
calculations on the assumption that Ontario would be unwilling to enter an agreement, thereby depriving Ottawa of that 
province’s lucrative tax revenues, this memo concluded that the net gain to New Brunswick would be a mere $360,000, 
leading the author to conclude that under the Rowell-Sirois plan New Brunswick “would do no better even from a 
financial standpoint. . .than it is doing at present.”47 
This second memo also took a much more critical stance with regard to the impact of the Rowell-Sirois Report on 
the structure of Canadian federalism, a subject the first memo had ignored. The unknown author recommended to McNair 
that he keep in mind the power that the constitution grants the province to levy personal income, corporation, and 
inheritance taxes, and insisted that these taxation rights “should not be lightly thrown away.” This urgent defence of the 
structure of federalism was prompted by two factors. First, the memo makes the important point that “it is impossible to 
foretell how valuable such powers may be in the future” and that to cede their “potential value” would be fiscally 
irresponsible. Second, the memo cautioned McNair that relinquishing these tax fields, even for a generous financial 
subsidy, would result in a loss of provincial prestige. Maintenance of provincial prestige was imperative, as the memo’s 
author anticipated that the coming years would see the further renegotiation of federal and provincial responsibilities. As 
the author makes clear, “It seems to me that the more authority to be placed in the hands of the Dominion parliament 
means more prestige to that parliament. If questions arise in the future as to the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council 
or other suggested changes in the constitution, it would be as well for New Brunswick to maintain its prestige.”48 The 
breakdown of the conference meant that McNair did not have to choose between this memo and the more optimistic one 
penned by Jones. 
On 31 March, Ilsley made good on his threat to end Dominion assistance for direct unemployment relief, and in 
his 29 April budget address he announced the federal government’s intent to commandeer certain tax fields to prosecute 
the war effort. As part of the federal government’s proposed Wartime Tax Agreement, the provinces were asked to 
surrender income and corporation taxes in return for a fixed annual grant and a fiscal need subsidy if needed.49 
Furthermore, the Dominion agreed not to interfere with the special taxes that the provinces levied on timber limits, oil 
wells, mining, or other natural resources, and guaranteed that should provincial revenues from gasoline taxes fall below 
the 1940 level, they would make up the difference.50 
It is important to recognize that the Wartime Tax Agreement was distinct from the recommendations put forth by 
the Rowell-Sirois Commission. Although both the Rowell-Sirois recommendations and the Wartime Tax Agreement 
called for the federal government to assume the sole authority to levy certain tax fields, there the similarities ended. The 
Rowell-Sirois recommendations were designed to be a permanent re-configuration of Canada’s federal structure, complete 
with the recognition of regional disparities and the need for grants to ensure a minimum standard of social services for all 
Canadians. The Wartime Tax Agreement, on the other hand, was simply a wartime convenience designed to allocate to 
the federal government the funds necessary to successfully prosecute the war effort without any commitment to the 
provision of social services, while leaving the provinces in a secure enough financial position to weather the conflict. As 
Stephen Henderson has suggested, the Rowell-Sirois Commission viewed the centralization of tax authority as a necessary 
precursor to a more equitable redistribution of wealth to the peripheral provinces through the National Adjustment Grant 
system. In this manner, centralization and provincialism were not at odds, and were, in important ways, opposite sides of 
the same coin.51 The Wartime Tax Agreement, on the other hand, called for the centralization of tax authority without any 
corresponding long-term recognition of regional disparities or the vagaries of provincial need. As a result, under the 
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The proposed Wartime Tax Agreement necessitated a December round of meetings between the Dominion and 
the provinces.52 At this conference the federal government made an important concession to the Maritime Provinces 
regarding non-statutory subsidies that had been paid to the eastern provinces. The Maritime delegates held that in reality 
these payments amounted to de facto statutory subsidies. Faced with this petition, the federal government adopted a 
curiously incongruous position. Although they would not pay the subsidies while the Wartime Tax Agreement was in 
effect, they apparently agreed with the Maritime position: 
It has been pointed out and the dominion government agrees that the special grants to the 
Maritime Provinces awarded as a result of the Duncan and White Commissions represent in fact, 
an additional subsidy which the Dominion is morally bound to continue. It is for this reason that a 
special clause is to be inserted in the agreements with the Maritime Provinces that the Dominion 
recognizes that these grants are in the nature of a subsidy and undertakes to continue paying them 
upon the termination of the proposed agreement.53 
The Dominion also promised to incorporate this in a new statute “so as to avoid any possibility of 
misunderstanding at a later date.”54 To this end Ottawa passed The Maritime Provinces Additional Subsidies Act (1942), 
which implemented the recommendations of the White Commission by guaranteeing New Brunswick $900,000, Nova 
Scotia $1,300,000, and Prince Edward Island $275,000 per annum. While this seems to have benefited the Maritime 
Provinces, it may have simply been a way for Ottawa to try to pull the region on side. Not only were these subsidies not 
payable while the Wartime Tax Agreement was in effect, they were simply the codification of amounts that the region 
was already receiving.55 
In his closing remarks to the conference McNair made clear New Brunswick’s position. Although he felt that the 
atmosphere at the conference “compared more favourably” with that of the Rowell-Sirois Conference, he regretted that 
the broader Rowell-Sirois recommendations were off the table, lamenting that “we did not get to the point where we could 
have discussed what had been presented by a competent as something in the nature of a constructive plan.”56 Moreover, 
McNair was displeased with Ottawa’s use of 1940 as the base year for calculating the rental payments, for the federal 
government was entering the provincial tax fields when their yields were on the increase and then would return them 
when the yields were declining.57 McNair was also dissatisfied with New Brunswick’s $300,000 fiscal need subsidy under 
the Wartime Tax Agreement, for under the Rowell-Sirois recommendations the province would have received “in round 
figures, ten times the amount indicated.” However, since the threat of the war was of paramount concern he would accept 
the proposal as it was, and he would “recommend to the legislature, as soon as possible, the adoption of the agreement.”58 
McNair made good on his promise and, on 27 March 1942, the Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick assented to An 
Act To Suspend Temporarily the Imposition of Income Taxes, Corporations Taxes, and Taxes on Securities. 
New Brunswick benefited financially under the Wartime Tax Agreement. This arrangement guaranteed 
Fredericton an annual payment of $3,278,574.15, although the province was to give up revenues of $3,350,067.45 and 
suffer a net loss of $71,493.30 under the agreement. Ottawa agreed to make up this net loss as well as pay a yearly fiscal 
need subsidy of $300,000. In essence, although New Brunswick’s fiscal need subsidy was stated as $371,493.30, the 
province’s net gain over its 1940 revenue was $300,000.59 This agreement effectively stabilized the revenues of New 
Brunswick for the duration of the war, and the full employment of the wartime boom—and the subsequent decline in 
relief expenditures—meant that the province’s financial position was improved for the duration of the conflict. Moreover, 
the temporary nature of the Wartime Tax Agreement made further negotiations between Ottawa and the provinces 
inevitable. 
New Brunswick’s financial position was not the only thing altered during the war; the province also saw an 
increase in industrialization.60 While few war orders were placed within the province, “[t]he general economic prosperity 
of the nation ... overflowed into [the] region.”61 An indication of this wartime “economic prosperity” was the rise in 
manufacturing output in the province by 112 percent during the war. Yet despite this wartime boom, New Brunswick’s 
competitive position had deteriorated. The Maritime Provinces were not central to Ottawa’s wartime industrialization 
program and, as a result, emerged from the conflict in a weaker economic position vis à vis the central provinces than they 
had been in before the outbreak of the conflict. This lack of investment was particularly detrimental to New Brunswick, 
where the prospect of numerous returning veterans, combined with the end of wartime demand, would, it was feared, lead 
to “the re-emergence of the old economic weaknesses.”62 Moreover, McNair knew that New Brunswickers would not 
tolerate a return to pre-war conditions. As his secretary R.A. Tweedie later recalled, McNair “used to say that people just 
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won’t believe, after the war effort, that we can’t stop people from being unemployed and can’t provide three square meals 
for everyone.”63 
With the end of war in Europe, Ottawa, keen to avert a post-war economic collapse, invited the provinces in 1945 
to a conference to discuss how the federal government could assist the provinces in meeting their post-war obligations, a 
motive that would require a discussion regarding the renegotiation of certain responsibilities of the provinces and Ottawa. 
The federal government offered specific proposals to achieve these goals. Commonly called the Green Book Proposals, 
these included a three-tiered plan in the areas of public investment, social services, and such fiscal matters as an extension 
of the Wartime Tax Agreements.64 Yet despite the Green Book’s broad proposals regarding the establishment of the 
welfare state, the bulk of discussion at the conference revolved around financial matters. Rather than use the format 
proposed by the Rowell-Sirois Commission, whereby a National Adjustment Grant would be allocated to aid the poorer 
provinces, Ilsley proposed a three-year extension of the Wartime Tax Agreement of 1942, with a $12 per capita grant, to 
be adjusted in proportion to changes in population and Gross National Production. Since Ottawa’s bureaucratic 
intelligentsia had accepted Keynesian economic theory and favoured increased state intervention in the economy, the 
justification for the federal government’s continued exclusive occupation of the personal income, corporation, and 
succession tax fields followed Keynes’s recommendation of counter-cyclical budgeting to avert a post-war depression 
similar to that which followed the First World War. 
Ilsley’s proposals suited McNair just fine. While still committed to the principle of fiscal need, he was not averse 
to an extension of the Tax Rental Agreement. Earlier that year, in the Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick, McNair 
had stated that “[t]he plan of operation which brought about the existing financial arrangements between the Dominion 
and the Provinces may well prove the pattern of action in the post-war period. It makes possible the negotiation of proper 
financial terms between the Dominion and the Provinces.”65 This was not an attitude that McNair came to blindly. In The 
Regional Economy of New Brunswick, a study commissioned by the New Brunswick Committee on Reconstruction, J.R. 
Petrie, a professor of economics at the University of New Brunswick and the committee’s secretary, argued that “income 
and corporation taxes, and succession duties be transferred to the federal authority. . .[and a] system of federal grants in 
lieu of these taxes should be worked out,” which echoed the recommendations put forth by the Rowell-Sirois Commission 
for federal control of these tax fields in return for payments to the provinces.66 Furthermore, New Brunswick’s experience 
with the Wartime Tax Agreement had already shown McNair the merits of a guaranteed source of provincial revenue and 
had weakened his commitment to maintaining sole provincial authority to these taxes as a matter of provincial right. But 
although McNair now agreed in principle with the idea of transferring these tax fields to the federal government, he was 
not enamoured with the terms and was particularly wary of a subsidy based upon the GNP which could, in the event of an 
economic downturn feared to be likely at war’s end, cut the revenues and rental fees paid to the provinces when they 
needed these funds the most. Moreover, McNair believed that a common per capita grant was unacceptable as it ignored 
the concept of fiscal need and existing standards of provincial services. Yet despite these concerns, McNair certainly had 
reason to be optimistic when he returned to Ottawa that November. 
His hopes would be dashed, however, when the Government of Ontario made its counter-proposals. Ontario 
Premier George Drew opposed vacating the personal income or corporation tax fields, or of giving up his province’s right 
to levy succession duties.67 While he veiled his objections in the structure of federalism set out by the British North 
America Act,68 his primary concern was that because of 
Ontario’s increasing industrial and other production, it is certain that the revenue from personal 
income and corporation taxes and succession duties will increase more rapidly than the increase 
in the suggested subsidy payment to the Province based on gross national product per capita as 
estimated by the Dominion Government.69 
  Drew acknowledged that some of the provinces would not be able to provide adequate services funded solely by 
the monies collected through their income and corporation taxes. In place of a per capita subsidy, Drew proposed the 
establishment of what he termed “The National Adjustment Fund,” which would be comprised of 10 percent of each 
province’s income garnered from personal income taxation, corporation taxation, and succession duties. This pooled 
revenue would then be apportioned by a Dominion-Provincial Coordinating Committee to those provinces that were 
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Ontario’s counter-proposals were not well received by New Brunswick.71 R.S. Fitzrandolph, New Brunswick’s 
chief financial advisor at the conference, cautioned McNair that the “Ontario proposals. . .[do not] offer a satisfactory 
substitute or alternative to those of the Dominion” for they did not guarantee a minimum level of assistance to the poorer 
provinces.72 W.B. Trites, New Brunswick’s Deputy Provincial Secretary-Treasurer, agreed, advising McNair that 
Ontario’s proposals “would cause a great many difficulties and. . .would not be advantageous to the provinces.”73 McNair 
took Trites’ advice to heart, and when he presented New Brunswick’s submission to the conference, he made no mention 
of Ontario’s counter-proposals, instead stressing the inadequacy of a per capita subsidy to meet the province’s needs. New 
Brunswick, McNair argued, required a fiscal need subsidy “to permit local and provincial services to be raised to the 
average standard prevailing throughout Canada without raising internal taxation beyond the general level in all 
provinces.”74 Still, the premier was “prepared to accept the Dominion proposals in broad principle” while still calling for 
the inclusion of a “plan to provide for the more needy provinces supplementary grants based on their financial 
circumstances.”75 
Over the next week the conference deteriorated as neither Ontario nor Ottawa would budge from their positions. 
The deadlock angered McNair; while Ontario could afford to refuse an extension of the Wartime Tax Agreement—its 
large population and disproportionate share of industry meant Ontario could raise enough money to support its needs 
through its own personal income and corporation taxes—New Brunswick could not. On 2 May McNair addressed the 
conference in strongly nationalist terms: 
I am not here to ask consideration for the people I represent because they live in New Brunswick. 
I base my case for them on higher ground, on the fact that they live in Canada and as Canadians 
are entitled to a fair show and a square deal at the hands of their fellow Canadians—nothing 
more, nothing less.76 
McNair’s linking of centralization and nationalism had little effect, and the conference adjourned sine die. 
With the conference’s failure, the Dominion followed its familiar template and set aside the social welfare aspects 
of the Green Book and began to negotiate tax agreements with the provinces on an ad hoc basis. This was something 
Ottawa was well prepared for, having discussed the possibility of negotiating with individual provinces solely regarding 
the tax agreements as early as 20 June 1945.77 Although McNair perceived the necessity of these Tax Rental Agreements, 
he reminded the federal government that they were “only one aspect or part of that programme” advanced by Dominion at 
the conference: 
Of equal importance, particularly as affecting the people in the smaller Provinces, were the public investment 
and resources development proposals and the social security and health plans which formed integral parts of the 
Dominion’s original program.78 
  While this agreement would stabilize the province’s finances, without the allocations for public investment, social 
security, and health grants, the level of services in New Brunswick would still fall short of the Canadian average. 
However, McNair was under pressure to reach an agreement by 1 November, the date that New Brunswick’s 
Wartime Tax Agreement expired and the beginning of the province’s fiscal year. This was the earliest beginning to a 
provincial fiscal year in Canada, which placed the New Brunswick premier under added pressure to finalize negotiations 
with Ottawa and ensure his province a guaranteed source of revenue. Although fiscal need was not recognized in the 
agreement, the Dominion’s proposals were attractive to McNair because they guaranteed greater provincial income than if 
the province retained control of its personal income, corporation, and succession tax fields. Thus, on 31 October 1946, 
New Brunswick was the first province to enter a Tax Rental Agreement with Ottawa.79 
It should be noted that the Tax Rental Agreements proposed by the federal government did not necessarily 
conflict with McNair’s commitment to provincial rights. Both the federal and provincial governments had the 
constitutional right to impose these taxes. All that the provinces were agreeing to was to refrain from collecting these 
taxes for a fixed period of time—thereby granting Ottawa exclusive access to these tax fields—in return for a fixed 
payment. As Nova Scotia Premier Angus L. Macdonald would later remark, the 1947 Tax Rental Agreement was “solely 
a financial agreement and is temporary in nature.”80 Such a temporary agreement did not necessitate a constitutional 
amendment; it only required the passage of an act agreeing to the terms in each province’s legislature. Thus, while taxing 
capacity was centralized for a brief period of time under the Wartime Tax Agreement and the 1947 Tax Rental 
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Agreement, the constitutional right to these tax fields would revert to the provinces (and Ottawa) when the agreements 
expired. McNair made clear that New Brunswick’s quick acceptance of the 1947 proposals stemmed, “in no small 
measure. . .[from] the fact that acceptance of such plans involves no constitutional change.”81 What is more, McNair 
hoped that by signing on to the 1947 tax plan, the broader proposals encompassed by the Green Book would once again 
be on the table. As the New Brunswick premier told The Maritime Advocate and Busy East, he supported Ottawa’s plan 
with the “expectation that the Dominion would consider all the [social welfare] matters that had been under discussion.”82 
New Brunswick’s early entry into an arrangement with Ottawa would cause McNair some political difficulty in 
mid-December, when it was revealed that British Columbia had received a substantially better financial deal. In its deal 
with Ottawa, New Brunswick had been offered a choice: $15 per capita based on either the 1941 or 1942 census, to 
increase proportionately with population and GNP, or 150 percent of what it would have collected under the Wartime Tax 
Agreement. McNair opted for the per capita option. British Columbia’s arrangement appeared essentially the same, save 
for one minor clause that would have major repercussions. For New Brunswick, only the per capita payment would rise 
relative to population and GNP increases; the 150 percent option was a static payment. For British Columbia, both choices 
would be influenced by population and GNP growth. Therefore, by choosing the 150 percent option, British Columbia 
had a guaranteed minimum payment of $21 per capita that would increase proportionate to the GNP.  Accordingly, were 
the GNP to increase by 10 percent, New Brunswick would receive $15 per capita plus 10 percent ($1.50), for a total 
payment of $16.50 per capita. British Columbia, on the other hand, would receive $21 per capita plus 10 percent ($2.10), 
for a total payment of $23.10. Thus, under this arrangement, British Columbia “must permanently and progressively 
receive a higher price for its taxes than any other province.”83 Since the New Brunswick legislature had not yet ratified the 
Tax Rental Agreement, McNair put the legislation on hold and suspended relations with Ottawa until “counterbalancing 
adjustments” to New Brunswick’s deal were put in place. This tactic proved successful, and by January 1947 McNair 
announced that New Brunswick had finalized a new agreement with the federal government that saw the province’s 
financial take jump from an estimated $7.5 million to over $9.5 million, with a guaranteed minimum payment of 
$8,773,420.84 However, the fact that New Brunswick had to suspend relations with Ottawa in order to effect a better deal 
reveals the lack of inter-provincial cooperation in the negotiation of the 1947 Tax Rental Agreements. 
Following the signing of the 1947 Tax Rental Agreement, J.B. McNair did not give up hope of the recognition of 
fiscal need or the implementation of a broader social welfare and public works plan. When Mackenzie King stepped down 
after almost 30 years in office, McNair used the 1948 convention that chose Louis St. Laurent to be King’s successor as a 
national forum for his views. “[T]he maintenance of our national income at a high level,” McNair told the assembled 
delegates, was “dependent on the production of goods and services,. . .construction and other works projects, and. . .social 
security measures.” Characteristic of a premier whose province was undertaking a massive road building and 
infrastructure development scheme, McNair believed that Canada’s future prosperity was contingent upon increased state 
intervention and argued that “a full scale public works program. . .is essential to the nation’s well being.” He also used the 
convention as a platform to once again champion the principle of fiscal need by complaining that “economic injustices 
still exist” between the provinces, necessitating future federal initiatives that would ensure that “those sections less 
fortunately endowed by nature or geography should not become the poorer because of those policies.”85 
McNair would get the chance to make his case to Prime Minister St. Laurent at the December 1950 Dominion-
Provincial Conference.86 Owing to fears that the ongoing conflict in Korea might escalate into a third world war, the 1950 
conference was a relatively brief, straightforward, and orderly affair with two main objectives. First, it was to negotiate an 
extension of the 1947 Tax Rental Agreements. Second, it was to discuss the possibility of implementing universal old age 
pensions. However, Ottawa had learned from its mistakes at past conferences and ensured in 1950 that the social security 
proposals and the tax rental proposals were not interconnected. Outright refusal of one would not negate the adoption of 
the other. Furthermore, the adoption of the universal old age pension was almost a forgone conclusion as all provinces 
favoured it to some extent, and the conference quickly reached agreement on the issue.87 
Almost as congenial were the discussions surrounding the proposed extension of the 1947 Tax Rental Agreement. 
By now those provinces that had accepted Tax Rental Agreements were, with the exception of Nova Scotia, quite willing 
to enter into another.88 For them this conference was nothing more than a formality and a chance to perhaps effect a more 
profitable financial agreement with Ottawa. As McNair informed St. Laurent in August 1950, “a major concern for us is 
our responsibility to the people of New Brunswick and our ability to provide them with the services within provincial 
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the existing Tax Rental Agreements, although the New Brunswick premier suggested that “the formulae in which the 
existing agreements are based might be revised to provide more fully for the needs of all the provinces.”90 Again McNair 
brought up the principle of fiscal need subsidies for the poorer provinces, but by this point it seems as though the New 
Brunswick premier was tilting against windmills. Ottawa had come to the meeting with a specific agenda, and the 
provision of fiscal need subsidies was not on the itinerary. Indeed, the exclusion of fiscal need in the 1951 tax proposals 
had no bearing on McNair’s decision; New Brunswick, along with Prince Edward Island, was the first to accept the 
Dominion’s offer.91 Eventually, all provinces except Quebec signed on to the 1951 Tax Rental Agreement.92 
Political scientist Reginald Whitaker observed that in New Brunswick “there has never been any important 
friction between the federal and provincial wings of the Liberal party.”93 A review of New Brunswick’s position on the 
renegotiation of federalism in the 1940s supports this conclusion; despite McNair’s last-second suspension of federal-
provincial relations over British Columbia’s 1947 Tax Rental Agreement, he consistently played the role of the “good 
Liberal” throughout his tenure, and he generally supported Ottawa’s initiatives. Although McNair carried the torch for the 
principle of fiscal need during the constitutional discussions of the 1940s, as the decade went on he seemed increasingly 
eager to cede his province’s tax rights to Ottawa in exchange for a secure source of provincial revenue. Indeed, it would 
not be until McNair had been replaced as premier by Conservative Hugh John Flemming that New Brunswick would 
become more of a thorn in the federal government’s side. This tactic seemed more profitable, for Flemming helped lead 
the successful campaign for equalization payments, and their explicit recognition of regional disparities, during the 
1950s.94 
During the constitutional negotiations of the 1940s New Brunswick Premier John McNair’s belief that the BNA 
Act encouraged the redistribution of wealth from richer to poorer provinces led him to invoke the compact theory of 
Confederation to lobby, somewhat inconsistently, for federal recognition of fiscal need and increased federal assistance to 
disadvantaged provinces. The inherent incongruity of this position, the outbreak of a war that placed provincial rights in 
conflict with national self-interest, and New Brunswick’s consistently unenviable financial position weakened McNair’s 
commitment to the compact theory, and as the years went on it seemed to have increasingly become a ploy to try to effect 
a more equitable fiscal arrangement for his province. Yet McNair’s position can only be appreciated when one considers 
the financial pressures his province was under during the 1940s; his fight for recognition of fiscal need is emblematic of 
the severe monetary constraints facing his province, and his quick entry into and endorsement of the Tax Rental 
Agreements stemmed from New Brunswick’s unenviable financial position. The province, which in 1935 had been 
Canada’s strongest defender of provincial rights, had been wracked by the economic and social strains of the Great 
Depression and only marginally integrated into Ottawa’s wartime industrialization program. As a result, during the 1940s 
the province found itself unable to fund an adequate level of social services and programs—programs the wartime boom 
had led New Brunswickers to expect—through its personal income taxes, corporation taxes, and succession duties. 
Moreover, McNair’s personal view of the purpose of Confederation contributed to his decision to cede tax powers 
to Ottawa during the 1940s. While the New Brunswick premier had been a disciple of provincial rights ideology during 
the 1930s, he also tenaciously clung to the idea that Canada’s federal system was intended to improve the welfare of the 
provinces and, as a result, he firmly believed that federalism mandated that the stronger provinces should help the weaker 
provinces. The 1940s Tax Rental Agreements seemed a perfect solution to New Brunswick’s troubles. In signing on, the 
province received a secure source of revenue in exchange for its income and succession taxes, yet it retained the right to 
these tax fields upon the agreement’s expiry. Thus, when Ottawa offered New Brunswick substantially more for these tax 
fields than the province collected from them, McNair was quick to agree, and he soon came to appreciate this guaranteed 
source of provincial income. In so doing, one of the champions of provincial rights during the 1930s became a willing 
participant in the centralization of tax power in Ottawa’s hands a decade later. 
Corey Slumkoski is a graduate of Carleton University and the University of New Brunswick. He is an Assistant 
Professor of History at Mount Saint Vincent University. His monograph, Inventing Atlantic Canada: Regionalism and the 
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